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LECTURE
PATENTS, PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY, AND
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION: HOW LAW
DIRECTS BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT*
Rebecca S. Eisenberg**
It's a great honor for me to be invited to deliver the Levine
Distinguished Lecture at Fordham, and a great opportunity to try out
some new ideas before this audience. As some of you know, I've been
studying the role of patents in biomedical research and product
development ("R&D") for close to twenty years now, with a
particular focus on how patents work in "upstream" research in
universities and biotechnology companies that are working on
research problems that arise prior to "downstream" product
development. But, of course, the patent strategies of these institutions
are designed around the profits that everyone hopes will flow from
downstream products, and the most lucrative of those products are
drugs. If a biotechnology company looks for a while like they are up
to something other than staking out claims that will permit them to
tap into drug profits, they often eventually seem to change their
business model, or else they get folded into a company that is more
squarely focused on profiting from drug development. So much of the
impetus for private sector investment in biomedical R&D turns out to
be about drug development.
Drug development is a famously patent-sensitive field of
technology. But over the years I have come to suspect that looking at
biopharmaceutical R&D from the perspective of the patent system
alone is an incomplete and lopsided approach. Drug development is
bracketed by two huge regulatory systems-the patent system and the
drug regulation system, i.e., the laws administered by the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA"). The core function of the patent
system is to motivate and reward the development of new inventions,
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while the core function of the drug regulation system, at least as
originally conceived, is to protect consumers from products that are
unsafe, ineffective, or fraudulently marketed.1 Patent law and FDA
law tend to be handled by different people, even within a firm. In the
pharmaceutical industry, FDA work is typically done by regulatory
departments that are separate from legal departments and are staffed
mostly by scientists and doctors, not lawyers. Although there are
growing legions of patent lawyers, there are still relatively few lawyers
who do FDA work. Billions of dollars 2 hinge on these products, and
only a tiny community of lawyers specialize in this area. Although as
a formal matter patent law and drug law are independent and have
different missions, they have an important functional interrelationship
that bears closer examination.
I. HOW THE "REAL WORLD" WORKS

A few years ago I had a casual conversation that really brought this
home to me and persuaded me that I needed to learn more about drug
regulation in order to do my work as a patent scholar. I sit on a panel
on Science, Technology & Law for the National Academies, a group
of scientists, doctors and lawyers that meets several times a year to
talk about topics in technology and law and figure out what more the
Academies should be doing to study them. After one of these
meetings, I was sharing a cab back to the airport with a doctor who is
also a member of the same panel, and she made a casual observation
that really got my attention. She told me that when a drug goes off
patent, it becomes available over the counter. This is a woman of
considerable intelligence and sophistication, so I was puzzled that she
should fall for what seemed like a fundamental confusion between
these two separate legal regimes. I patiently started to explain that
patents are a system of legal rights designed to spur innovation,
administered by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), while
determinations of whether drugs may be sold over the counter or
require a prescription are made by the FDA on the basis of
considerations of health and safety, and that these decisions have
nothing to do with whether a drug is still under patent. She assured
me that she understood all that, but she was sharing with me her
observations about how the real world works, and in practice, when a
drug goes off patent, it becomes available over the counter. I
wondered, could that possibly be true? Why would it be true?
Well, I realized that, in order to figure that out, I had to learn more
1. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting FunctionalBalanceof Patent and Drug
Regulation, Health Aff., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 121.
2. In 2002, Merck alone had more than $51 billion in sales. Merck & Co., Inc.,
Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2002 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-03305,
at 2, availableat http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar.
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about drug regulation. As I have set about doing that, with my
patent-centric world view, I have discovered that FDA law is
fundamentally about regulation of biomedical innovation and it is
critical for somebody who studies Intellectual Property in biomedical
innovation to understand both systems and how they relate. None of
this is to understate the importance of patents. Biomedical research is
a huge part of overall R&D in both public and private sectors, and it is
an area in which patents really seem to matter. If you talk to people
from different segments of the public and private biomedical research
establishment, you get somewhat different, although ultimately
complementary, stories about just why patents matter.
The pharmaceutical industry has long maintained that patents are
crucial to the financial viability of pharmaceutical R&D, that without
patents they could not survive in the costly and risky business of drug
development. Patents on drugs seem to operate the way legal scholars
and economists imagine patents are supposed to work, by giving their
owners monopoly power in product markets. This is not so in every
industry, for a variety of reasons. In many industries patents are
bargaining chips to bring about cross-licensing of complements, or
patented products face significant competition from patented or
unpatented substitutes. 3 But patented drugs really do command a
significant price premium in the market. When patents expire and
drugs face generic competition, their prices plummet. Other patented
drugs in the same class (like multiple patented AngiotensinConverting-Enzyme ("ACE") inhibitors or multiple patented
antidepressants) do not seem to have the same effect on prices as
generic competition from the same molecule. So while, in some
contexts, it may be misleading to say patents confer monopoly power,
in pharmaceuticals that statement is pretty accurate. Patents on drugs
permit firms to charge monopoly prices and make high profits. And
those profits motivate spending on R&D to find new patented
products.
The biotechnology industry is composed of a much more diverse set
of firms with different strategies for making money, but, like the
pharmaceutical industry, it also tends to be a big supporter of strong
patent protection. Biotech firms say that they need patents in order to
raise capital from investors to conduct their research and in order to
get pharmaceutical firms to partner with them to use their research
platforms to develop new products.
Meanwhile, universities claim that they need patents because the
private firms who are their licensees need patents, and a huge
percentage of university patenting is in biomedical research. If you
3. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 22
(2000) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552), available at
http://dsl.nber.org/papers/w7552.v5.pdf.
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press further and ask them to explain why they need patents on
inventions that others have brought to market without them, like the
University of Rochester patents claiming cox-2 inhibitors,4 they might
also concede that they would like to use their patents to bring in
revenue to support their own R&D.
Across the board, this is a very patent-sensitive field of research.
Empirical studies indicate that this is an area where decision makers
really care about patents when they think about spending money on
R&D, in contrast to other fields and industries that rate other, nonpatent factors as more important. Wherever patentable inventions
arise in the course of biomedical R&D, the stories that one hears
about why patents are important emphasize that patents drive private
sector R&D, and private sector R&D is a hugely important part of
biomedical research. In the past decade, despite steady increases in
National Institutes of Health ("NIH") funding aimed at doubling the
NIH budget, private funding has overtaken public funding.5 From the
private side, the profits that motivate investment in biomedical
research for the most part have to do with drug development.
Biopharmaceutical research is often held out as a shining example
of the success of the patent system in motivating private investment in
R&D. But it is such an outstanding success story, and so exceptional,
that one wonders whether patents are doing all the work of motivating
this R&D on their own. The patent system takes much credit for
motivating investment in biomedical research and product
development, and the industry never gives drug regulation any credit
for profits or for motivating R&D in a positive way. A standard
industry view of the relationship between patents and drug regulation
is that patents make drug development profitable, while drug
regulation makes it costly. But the more closely I look, the more
misleading this first approximation of the regulatory symbiosis
between patents and drug regulation seems to me.
As a patent scholar, I can speak with greater authority to the
oversimplification of the patent side of the story. It has long been
clear to me that patents contribute to the costs of drug development
as well as to its profits. Of course it is true that patents on drugs make
drug development more profitable, but patents on drugs are not the
only patents that accompany new drugs on the road to market.
Patents on drugs make drug development profitable by providing
patent owners with exclusivity in the market for new pharmaceutical
products. But patents do not necessarily track product markets-they
track inventions. And many inventions feed into drug development
today, including genomic information and databases, newly identified

4. University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y.
2003).
5. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 120.
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drug targets, animal models, new laboratory techniques and
instruments, and new reagents. Maybe long ago in a distant era, these
pre-market inventions were mostly unpatented, especially if they were
made in university labs with public funding. But for the last twenty
years, universities have been jumping on the patent gravy train
wherever they can, with the encouragement of federal law. These
early "upstream" inventions that explain disease pathways and
mechanisms and identify potential drug targets are increasingly likely
to be patented, and patents on these numerous discoveries impose
costs on drug development. These discoveries are like so many
siphons at the feeding trough of new drugs, draining away profits in
many different directions. I think what we see now is just the
beginning of a trend that will continue and accelerate as more
institutions that are involved in biomedical R&D figure out ways to
use patents to capture a share of the attractive profits that flow to the
developers of successful pharmaceutical products. So patents are a
source of costs as well as a source of profits for drug developers.
What about the regulatory side? Is that really all costs? Not at all.
The more I learn about the drug regulation, the more I see ways that
it supports the profitability of drug development even as it adds to its
costs.
II. THE REGULATORY SIDE
Perhaps it goes without saying that drug regulation poses a
significant entry barrier that seriously limits the firms that can
compete with market incumbents. Recent estimates, which may err
on the generous side, put the average costs of developing a new drug
to the point of new drug approval ("NDA") at approximately $800
million, after adjusting historical costs to present value to account for
the time value of money.6 A big chunk of that money comes from the
costs of conducting clinical trials to win FDA approval. Not many
firms have that kind of money. FDA regulation is costly for generic
competitors as well as for innovators. Generic competitors may avoid
a large portion of these costs by submitting an abbreviated new drug
application ("ANDA") showing bioequivalence to a previously
approved product, but generics are also less profitable, so the entry
barrier remains significant, although not insurmountable. This entry
barrier limits competition, thereby making drug development more
profitable.7
Beyond limiting competition indirectly by imposing costly

6. Ceci Connolly, Price Tag for a New Drug, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 2001, at A10
(reporting university study estimating that the "average cost of developing a new
prescription drug-including paying for the many failures-reached $802 million in
the 1990s").
7. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 121.
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regulatory burdens that limit market entry, the FDA also sometimes
confers formal exclusivity in product markets. There have been a
number of examples of these FDA-administered "pseudo-patents"
over the past twenty years.
An early example of FDA-conferred exclusivity is the Orphan Drug
Act of 1983.8 This Act provides seven years of market exclusivity for
products to treat rare diseases and conditions affecting fewer than
200,000 patients in the United States. 9 Some of these products have
huge markets when you take into account off-label use.
One year later, Congress added two more provisions for FDAadministered market exclusivity in the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984,1°
directing the FDA to award five years of market exclusivity for new
chemical entities not previously approved by the FDA, and three
years of exclusivity for making changes in a previously approved
product that require conducting new clinical trials to win FDA
approval. 1 (This latter provision sometimes applies, for example, to
changes in dosage form, or approval for new indications, or switches
from prescription to over-the-counter status, which may be part of the
answer to the puzzle posed by my doctor friend in the taxicab.) In
contrast to the Orphan Drug Act provisions, these Hatch-Waxman
Act exclusivity provisions merely prevent the FDA from allowing
competitors to obtain streamlined review of their applications without
having to submit a full NDA. They do not prevent a competitor from
obtaining approval by relying strictly on its own submitted data for
proof of safety and efficacy. In effect, these provisions amount to
FDA-administered proprietary rights in regulatory data, awarded to
encourage particular kinds of innovation in drug development rather
than to protect consumers from unsafe or ineffective drugs.
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 199712
added a provision for six months of exclusivity just for conducting
pediatric trials. This six-month period of exclusivity is not contingent
upon approval of the drug as safe and effective in children and is not
limited to pediatric use of the drug. It simply extends any existing
market exclusivity held by the submitter, whether under a patent, the
Orphan Drug Act, or Hatch-Waxman exclusivity provisions, further
deferring the time when the FDA might approve a competing generic
product.13
8. Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2000).
10. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(D)(ii), (iii) (2000).
12. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355a; see also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 123.
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Each of these provisions confers patent-like protection under the
auspices of the FDA rather than the PTO. Each may be better
understood as an economic measure designed to promote costly
investments in innovation than as a consumer protection measure
designed to keep unsafe or ineffective products off the market.
Considered together, they show a trend toward directing the FDA to
use its gatekeeper role in timing approval of pharmaceutical products
to serve a function traditionally relegated to the patent system:
promoting and rewarding innovation by granting valuable
exclusionary rights.
Other provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, or "Drug Price

Competition-Patent Term Restoration Act," as it was once called,"n

further blur the functional distinction between drug regulation and
patents, directing PTO to take regulation into account in determining
patent term and directing FDA to take patents into account in
approving drugs. The Hatch-Waxman Act allows the PTO to grant
patent term extensions of up to five years to compensate for
marketing delays during the regulatory review period prior to the first
permitted commercial marketing of a new drug." At the same time, it
sets up a complex system for keeping track of patents that cover
FDA-approved drugs and deferring regulatory approval of generic
versions of those drugs during patent challenges.
Holders of approved NDAs are required to disclose all patents that
they believe would be infringed by unauthorized sales of the approved
drug, and the FDA publishes the list in a publication called the
Orange Book. 6 Competing manufacturers who believe that their
products do not infringe these patents, or that some of the patents are
invalid, may file ANDAs seeking FDA approval for their products
prior to patent expiration, with notice to the patent owner. 7 But if
the patent owner files an infringement action against them within
forty-five days, FDA approval of the ANDA is stayed for thirty
months, no matter which side is correct on the legal arguments
(except in the unlikely event that a court resolves the issue earlier
than that).18 This gives pharmaceutical firms an incentive to be quite
expansive in listing the relevant patents, including, for example,
patents covering aspects of the product formulation that are easy to
This preserves more
design around to avoid infringement.
14. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.
15. 35 U.S.C. 156(g)(6)(B) (2000).
16. The FDA publishes the Orange Book annually, and also maintains a
searchable electronic database. See Food & Drug Admin., Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (CCH 23d ed. 2003); Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last modified Oct. 20,2003).
17. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 122.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C), (j)(4)(C);
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 122.
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opportunities to file lawsuits that will trigger the thirty month stay of
FDA approval, in effect prolonging the period of profitable market
exclusivity beyond what the listed patents (which may be invalid or
not infringed) could do on their own.
Another controversial Hatch-Waxman provision that has the effect
of prolonging exclusivity is the provision of a 180-day period of
exclusivity to the first generic applicant to file a patent challenge
against any approved drug. 9 This is the clearest example of
unintended consequences in the Hatch-Waxman Act, and is the
subject of reform proposals. Designed to spur generic competition
with products covered by questionable patents, this provision has
instead provided a strategic opportunity to defer generic competition
in products that patent law would otherwise leave unprotected.
The first challenger and the patent owner simply reach a
"settlement" that affirms the validity and infringement of the patent,
knowing that subsequent challengers will be ineligible for the 180-day
exclusivity and thus unlikely to bring their generic versions of the
product to market in the interim.20 The Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") has challenged this under the antitrust laws, and legislation is
pending to address it.2' Again, this is another example of how the
combination of patents and drug-specific regulation provides longer
exclusivity than the patent system could do on its own.
Another increasingly important role played by the FDA in
supporting the profitability of drug development beyond what patents
do has to do with parallel imports. Drug markets are most lucrative in
the United States; somewhat less so in Canada, Western Europe, and
Japan; and much less so in sub-Saharan Africa, especially with
pressure to provide drugs cheaply to meet public health needs. 22
Overall profitability depends on the ability to keep cheap drugs from
moving to higher-margin markets through arbitrage. Although U.S.
patent law in this area is quite murky, drug regulation offers
reasonably effective protection against parallel imports without regard
to patent law.
The "first sale" doctrine,23 which permits me to sell my car without
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 122.
20. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 122-23.
21. Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2003, S. 54, 108th Cong.
§ 5(a)(2) (2003); see also Janet A. Gongola, Note, Prescriptionsfor Change: The
Hatch-Waxman Act and New Legislation to Increase the Availability of Generic Drugs
to Consumers, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 787, 802-16 (2003) (summarizing past litigation and
pending legislation); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the "Presumptive Illegality"
Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A
Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1789, 1798 n.43
(2003) (discussing past litigation and listing consent decrees entered into by the FRC
and drug companies).
22. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 129.
23. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum et al., Principles of Patent Law 1118-41 (2d ed.
2001); Tait R. Swanson, Combating Gray Market Goods in a Global Market:
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permission from whoever owns all the patents on its various
components, arguably limits the power of patent owners to exclude
imports of patented products that they previously agreed to sell
abroad. The national laws of different countries disagree on this
point. Some hold that the first sale doctrine only permits resales
within the same country, while others follow a rule of "international
exhaustion" and hold that once the patent holder has authorized sale
of an item anywhere in the world, the purchaser is free to resell
anywhere in the world without needing further permission of the
patent owner.24 There has been a big debate about this issue in trade
negotiations, but so far no agreement, leaving each nation free to
choose its own exhaustion rule. The United States' bargaining
position, supported by the pharmaceutical industry, has been that
every nation should follow a rule of national exhaustion. But it is not
at all clear that this is the law in the United States.
If patented drugs sold abroad could be imported into the United
States and resold over the objections of the patent holder, it would be
very difficult to maintain the higher prices for patented drugs that now
prevail in the U.S. market. Importers would simply buy the drugs in a
low-price market and resell them in the United States. But whether
U.S. patent law permits this arbitrage really does not matter, because
drug regulation fills this potentially important gap in patent
protection.
For one thing, differences in drug regulation make it hard to get
imports into U.S. and other lucrative markets. The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce
(including by importation) of new drugs except pursuant to approved
NDAs, and these approvals are limited to products made in specified
manufacturing facilities and sold under an approved label. 25 This
protection from imports is fortified by Prescription Drug Marketing
Act of 1987, which specifically prohibits re-importation of previously
exported U.S.-manufactured drugs except by the manufacturer, unless
required for emergency medical care. 26 There is a genuine health and
safety issue lurking behind these provisions, but they also have an
economic side effect that may be even more important.
This
economic side effect has brought renewed political attention to the
prohibition against re-importation, as some legislators have sought to
give U.S. consumers the benefit of cheaper drug prices in Canada.
We can see in this brief overview that FDA regulation, in addition
Comparative Analysis of Intellectual Property Laws and Recommended Strategies, 22
Hous. J. Int'l L. 327, 342-44 (2000).
24. Chisum, supra note 23, at 1121-28.
25. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000).
26. Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (1987) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.). The specific provision banning unauthorized re-importation is
located at section 381(d)(1).
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to imposing costs in the form of tests to ensure health and safety, also
limits competition in drug markets in ways that enhance the
profitability of drug development. As the population ages and
becomes more concerned about health care, and as public and private
payors struggle to control rising health care costs, the laws that set the
ground rules for biomedical innovation are receiving closer and more
skeptical scrutiny, making it all the more important to understand just
what work is done by different parts of this complex regulatory web.
III. RE-EXAMINING THE FDA's ROLE

Does the current functional allocation make sense? In particular,
does it make sense to locate legal protection for exclusivity as an
economic incentive for R&D in FDA administered rules rather than
patent law? There are reasons to worry about it. Questions about
appropriate economic incentives for R&D seem to be peculiarly the
province of the patent system, and arguably outside the competence
of FDA. But there are also advantages to using FDA regulation as a
mechanism for providing exclusivity.
Our patent laws are one-size-fits-all, applying essentially the same
rules to biopharmaceutical research that apply to automotive
engineering, information technology, semiconductors, and rocket
science. But the needs of these fields for patent protection differ.
FDA regulation, by contrast, is industry-specific. It is hard to finetune the patent laws to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical industry
when the needs of other industries are different. We have some
industry-specific provisions, including the Hatch-Waxman patent term
extension provisions discussed earlier, biotechnology process patents
provisions, and prior user rights for business method patents. But
these provisions are awkward and cumbersome, and often illconsidered. It is also at least arguable that they violate our treaty
obligations. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ( the "TRIPS Agreement")27 prohibits discrimination
in the terms of patent protection depending on the field of technology.
Paradoxically, this provision was included at the behest of the
pharmaceutical industry to eliminate discrimination against drugs, but
the treaty language is written in broader terms that also prohibit
discrimination in favor of drug patents. It is arguable that we are
already in violation of these provisions. To the extent that the
exclusivity needs of the pharmaceutical industry differ from those of
other industries, it might be less problematic to fine-tune the drug
regulation rules than it is to fine-tune the patent system. Even if the
27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec.
15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
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World Trade Organization were to decide that so-called FDA
exclusivity is really a patent by another name, and that industryspecific pseudo-patents still violate our treaty obligations, the issue
might be easier to finesse if it were framed initially as drug regulation.
There are also reasons why it might be attractive from the
perspective of industry to get exclusivity from the FDA rather than
from the patent system. This is because the FDA provides product
exclusivity, while the patent system provides invention exclusivity.
When new product development uses many prior patented inventions,
strengthening patents adds to the costs of drug development as well as
the profits from selling new drugs.
On the other hand, in a political environment that is more
concerned with controlling the rising costs of drugs than with
fortifying incentives for new drug development, it may be harder to
sustain the complex regulatory web that currently supports high drug
It is politically difficult to change the patent system,
prices.
particularly in the post-TRIPS era,28 but there are lots of other levers
to push in the drug regulation system to chip away at the market
exclusivity that supports current drug prices, and FDA regulation
might make a better political target than patents. Eliminating FDAimposed restrictions on access to product markets fits with a probusiness, anti-regulation narrative, while cutting back on patent rights
sounds anti-business.
It is particularly important to understand the role of FDA
regulation in supporting biopharmaceutical innovation in the current
political environment, which is characterized by some hostility toward
the core functions of the FDA in protecting health and safety by
historical standards. For much of the FDA's history, Congress and
the courts have been broadly supportive of the agency's conservative
stance toward protecting the public from products that might be
hazardous or useless or both.29 In the past two decades that attitude
has turned around dramatically, as consumer sovereignty has come to
dominate consumer protection in the political discourse of product
regulation. Today, rather than being praised for keeping bad products
off the market, the FDA is more likely to be criticized as a
paternalistic bureaucracy imposing costly regulatory barriers between
patients who demand new products and an industry eager to deliver
those products.
It became strikingly apparent in the early days of the AIDS
epidemic that many patients were willing to take risks that the FDA
did not approve of rather than allow their illnesses to progress
pending definitive clinical trials of new products. Disease advocacy
groups and pharmaceutical firms forged a powerful political alliance
28. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 128-29.
29. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 123.
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to cut back on regulatory obstacles and bring new products to market
on a fast track. At the same time, the FDA's efforts to control
marketing claims by manufacturers for off-label uses have also come
under assault as violating the First Amendment, with the opponents of
regulatory controls scoring some significant victories in the courts.3"
In this changed political environment, the roles of the FDA as a
market gatekeeper (and censor of marketing claims) are likely to be
reappraised, making it especially important to understand just what
work the FDA does.
I suggest that any such reappraisal should consider the role of the
FDA in promoting biomedical innovation. Indeed, many of the
powers and authorities of the FDA make more sense from this
perspective than they do from the perspective of the agency's
traditional function of protecting consumers from purveyors of snake
oil.
Consider, for example, what may be the most powerful authority
exercised by the FDA: the power to approve or disapprove new drug
applications based on evaluation of data concerning safety and
efficacy. This market gatekeeper function was first granted to the
agency by Congress in 19383" to exclude unsafe products from the
market, and later expanded in 196232 to exclude ineffective products.
It imposes significant costs and risks on drug development, and seems
quaintly paternalistic when patients enjoy relatively unfettered access
to products like Ephedra. From a consumer protection perspective, it
is difficult to make sense of the present two-tiered market that
subjects ethical pharmaceutical products to rigorous regulatory
standards for scientifically sound proof of safety and efficacy, while
leaving the shelves of Whole Foods market full of substantially
untested and unregulated "dietary supplements" that purport to have
similar effects.
One might argue that we should eliminate the exemptions that
currently allow these dietary supplements and nutriceuticals to remain
on the market, but some consumers (including some members of
Congress) want these products and do not want the FDA to regulate
them, and they have succeeded so far in persuading Congress to keep
the FDA off their backs. Yet the existence of a relatively unregulated
dietary supplement market alongside a highly regulated

30. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (holding
prohibitions against prescription solicitations and advertising violated First
Amendment); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating
regulations requiring sellers of dietary supplements to obtain FDA approval before
labeling supplements with health claims).
31. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (2000)).
32. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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pharmaceuticals market poses a challenge to a justification for
regulation that rests on safety and consumer protection.
The FDA's approach to off-label use of products that have been
approved only for a narrower set of indications is also puzzling in
terms of consumer protection. On one hand, the FDA has no
authority over the practice of medicine,33 and leaves doctors free to
prescribe approved drugs for any purpose,3 4 notwithstanding the
absence of clinical trials to establish the safety and efficacy of the drug
for off-label uses. On the other hand, the FDA sharply curtails
(insofar as the courts will permit35 ) manufacturers' efforts to
disseminate information about off-label uses of drugs to physicians.
Do prescriptions for off-label uses threaten health and safety or not?
If so, then why permit them? If not, then why not permit-indeed
promote- dissemination of whatever information is available about
these uses to physicians to help them make the best choices possible
for their patients?
These boundaries of FDA regulation, although puzzling from a
consumer protection perspective, make considerably more sense from
the perspective of promoting innovation. The FDA uses its powers as
market gatekeeper and censor of marketing claims to promote
investments in scientifically sound clinical trials to generate valuable
information about drugs. This information is socially valuablevaluable to consumers, insurers, and health policy makers-but
manufacturers are not always in a position to capture that value, and
so we can't trust them to generate it in an unregulated market.
Indeed, in an important sense FDA-approved drugs are information
products. One could argue that information gathered in clinical trials
is what distinguishes the products we call "drugs" from chemicals sold
for other purposes, like industrial solvents, laundry detergents, and
herbal remedies. If this information were so valuable, one might
expect it to be generated without the intervention of the FDA, and of
course some of it is. But FDA-approved trials have more credibilitywith patients, doctors, and health payors-than studies done without
regulatory oversight, for an obvious reason. Manufacturers have an
interest in selling more of their products, and rigorous clinical trials
might generate information that has just the opposite effect.
A conspicuous example of this risk is the recent disclosure of
surprising results of an NIH-sponsored, double-blind, placebo33. See, e.g., Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting
legislative history of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act "expresses a specific intent to
prohibit FDA from regulating physicians' practice of medicine"), rev'd on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
physician could not be found liable for violating FDA regulations against misbranding
when administering drug to his own patients).
35. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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controlled study of the effects of hormone replacement therapy
("HRT") on risk of heart disease in post-menopausal women.36 Less
rigorous observational studies had previously suggested that women
who take HRT reduce their risk of heart disease, and this was enough
to lead to widespread off-label use of HRT for that purpose, although
the FDA had only approved it for relief of menopause symptoms.
When the NIH finally conducted a more rigorous study, the results
indicated a slightly increased risk of heart disease in women receiving
HRT,37 and sales of the product have dropped off significantly. In this
case, government funding provided valuable information that the
product's manufacturer had little incentive to uncover on its own.
We can think of FDA-mandated clinical trials as a way of
internalizing the cost of this sort of research to the manufacturers who
stand to profit from product sales, but that certainly is not the only
way to go. Alternatives include: publicly-funded clinical trials of
drugs, like the HRT study; regulatory "carrots" from the FDA, like
the market exclusivity offered as an inducement to conduct pediatric
clinical trials, rather than regulatory "sticks" such as restrictions on
marketing; tort liability for harms resulting from risks that should
have been discovered in the course of clinical trials and revealed to
patients or doctors; or perhaps payor/HMO-funded clinical trials to
determine which drugs are worth paying for (although payors thus far
have shown little interest in sponsoring such trials). Each of these
approaches has its pros and cons.
CONCLUSION

I have no strong bottom line about whether or how far the functions
of the FDA should be curtailed, augmented or reallocated. Currently
the National Institute for Alternative Medicine is conducting clinical
trials on some popular herbal remedies and nutriceuticals, such as
chondroitin and glucosamine sulfate for arthritis. These trials are
worth watching closely to see what we might expect from leaving
clinical trials of minimally regulated products to the government.
Another interesting innovation that makes sense if one considers the
role of the FDA from the perspective of innovation policy rather than
strictly consumer protection is greater reliance on post-marketing
studies, conducted under FDA supervision after a product is brought
to market, rather than requiring definitive clinical test results before a
product may be sold. The FDA pioneered this approach without clear

36. See Writing Group for the Women's Health Initiative Investigators, Risks and
Benefits of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal
Results from the Women's Health InitiativeRandomized Controlled Trial, JAMA, July
17, 2002, at 321-33.
37. Id.
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statutory authority as a part of its fast-track procedures, and Congress
later endorsed it in the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997.38
What alternatives we imagine depends on how we understand the
functions that the agency currently performs. If the function of the
FDA is understood solely in terms of protecting consumers from
dangerous or fraudulently marketed products, then some of its current
regulatory authorities might appear to be unduly costly and
paternalistic, and thus good candidates for reform. On the other
hand, if we recognize that the FDA has come to play an important
role in structuring incentives for biopharmaceutical innovation, some
otherwise puzzling features of its authorities make a bit more sense,
and we might be more reluctant to tamper with them without
considering the adequacy of other measures to achieve similar policy
goals.

38. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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